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Abstract—Access-control requirements for physical spaces, like
office buildings and airports, are best formulated from a global
viewpoint in terms of system-wide requirements. For example,
“there is an authorized path to exit the building from every
room.” In contrast, individual access-control components, such
as doors and turnstiles, can only enforce local policies, specifying
when the component may open. In practice, the gap between the
system-wide, global requirements and the many local policies
is bridged manually, which is tedious, error-prone, and scales
poorly.
We propose a framework to automatically synthesize local
access-control policies from a set of global requirements for
physical spaces. Our framework consists of an expressive lan-
guage to specify both global requirements and physical spaces,
and an algorithm for synthesizing local, attribute-based policies
from the global specification. We empirically demonstrate the
framework’s effectiveness on three substantial case studies. The
studies demonstrate that access-control synthesis is practical
even for complex physical spaces, such as airports, with many
interrelated security requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical access control is used to restrict access to physical
spaces. For example, it controls who can access which parts of
an office building or how personnel can move within critical
spaces such as airports or military facilities. As physical spaces
are usually comprised of subspaces, such as rooms connected
by doors, policies are enforced by multiple policy enforcement
points (PEPs). Each PEP is associated to a control point, like
a door, and enforces a local policy.
Consider, for example, an office building. An electronic
door lock might control access to an office by enforcing a
policy that states that only an employee may enter the office.
This policy is local in the sense that its scope is limited to
an individual enforcement point, here the office’s door. The
policy therefore does not guarantee that non-employees cannot
enter the office, since the office may have other doors. Neither
does it guarantee that employees can actually access the office.
If employees cannot enter the corridor leading to the office’s
door, then the local policy is useless.
In contrast to the local policies for enforcement points,
access-control requirements for physical spaces are typically
global. They express constraints on the access paths through
the entire space. In the example above, a requirement might
be that employees should be able to access the office from
the lobby. This requirement is global in that no single PEP
alone can guarantee its satisfaction. A standard electronic lock,
which enforces only local policies such as grant access to
employees, is oblivious to the physical constraints of the office
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Fig. 1: Access control synthesis for physical spaces
building and what policies the other PEPs enforce. It therefore
cannot address this requirement.
Problem Statement. The discrepancy between global re-
quirements and local policies creates an abstraction gap that
must be bridged when configuring access-control mechanisms.
We consider the problem of automatically synthesizing a set
of PEP policies that together enforce global access-control
requirements in a given physical space.
This problem is nontrivial. A given physical space usually
constrains the ways subjects may access its subspaces. These
constraints must be accounted for when configuring the in-
dividual PEPs. Moreover, global access-control requirements
may have interdependencies and hence their individual solu-
tions may not contribute to an overall solution. To illustrate
this lack of compositionality, suppose in addition to the
requirement that employees can access an office room from
the lobby, we require that they must not enter the area where
auditing documents are stored. Giving employees access to
their office through any path satisfies the first requirement,
but it would violate the second one if the path goes through
the audit area.
In practice, constructing local policies for a physical space is
a manual task where a security engineer writes individual poli-
cies, one per PEP, that collectively enforce the space’s global
requirements. This manual process results in errors, such as
granting access to unauthorized subjects or denying access to
authorized ones; the literature contains numerous examples of
such problems [1]–[3]. Moreover, engineers must manually
revise their policies whenever requirements are changed, or
when the physical space changes, e.g. due to construction
work. In short, writing local policies manually is error-prone
and scales poorly. Our thesis is that it is also unnecessary: the
automatic synthesis of local policies with system-wide security
guarantees is a viable alternative.
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Approach and Contributions. We propose a formal frame-
work for automatically synthesizing local policies that run
on distributed PEPs from a set of global access-control re-
quirements for a given physical space. The framework’s main
ingredients are depicted in Figure 1. The key component is a
synthesizer, which takes as input a model of the physical space
and a set of global requirements. The synthesizer’s output is
the set of local policies that the PEPs enforce. If the global
requirements are satisfiable, then the synthesizer is guaranteed
to output a correct set of local policies; otherwise, it returns
unsat to indicate that the requirements cannot be satisfied.
Hence, using our framework, engineers can generate local
policies from global requirements simply by formalizing the
global requirements and modeling the physical space.
Below, we briefly describe the framework’s components,
depicted in Figure 1. We use directed graphs to model physical
spaces: a node represents an enclosed space, such as an office
or a corridor, and an edge represents a PEP, for example
installed on a door or turnstile. The nodes are labeled to
denote their attributes. These attributes may include the assets
the node contains (audit documents), its physical attributes
(international terminal), and its clearance level (high security
zone). These attributes may be used when specifying policies.
Formally, our model of a physical space is a Kripke structure.
We give a declarative language, called SPCTL, for speci-
fying global requirements. Our language is built on the com-
putation tree logic (CTL) [4] and supports subject attributes
(e.g., an organizational role), time constraints (e.g., business-
hour requirements), as well as quantification over paths and
branches in physical spaces. To demonstrate its expressiveness,
we show how common physical access-control requirements
can be directly written in SPCTL. Moreover, to simplify the
task of formalizing such requirements, we develop requirement
patterns and illustrate their use through examples.
Our synthesis algorithm outputs attribute-based policies,
expressed as constraints over subject attributes and contextual
conditions, such as organizational roles and the current time.
This covers a wide range of practical setups and scenarios,
including attribute-based and role-based access control. We
strike a balance between the requirement language’s expres-
siveness and the complexity of synthesizing local policies. The
synthesis problem we consider is NP-hard. However, we show
that for practically-relevant requirements, it can be efficiently
solved using existing SMT solvers. This is intuitively because
physical spaces, in practice, induce directed graphs that have
short simple-paths. We illustrate our framework’s effectiveness
using three case studies where we synthesize access-control
policies for a university building, a corporate building, and an
airport terminal. Synthesizing local policies in each case takes
less than 30 seconds. The last two case studies are based on
real-world examples developed together with KABA AG, a
leading physical access control company.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first framework
for synthesizing policies from system-wide access-control
requirements. We thereby solve a fundamental problem in
access control for physical spaces. An immediate practical
consequence is that security engineers can focus on system-
wide requirements, and delegate to our synthesizer the task of
constructing the local policies with correctness guarantees. We
remark that although this work is focused on access control
for physical spaces, the ideas presented are general and can
be extended to other domains, such as computer networks
partitioned into subnetworks by distributed firewalls.
Organization. We give an overview of our access-control
synthesis framework in Section II. In Section III, we describe
and formalize our system model. In Section IV, we define
our SPCTL language for specifying global requirements, and
present requirement patterns. In Section V, we define the
policy synthesis problem and prove its decidability. In Sec-
tion VI, we define an efficient policy synthesis algorithm. In
Section VII, we describe our implementation and report on
our experiments. We review related work in Section VIII, and
we draw conclusions and discuss future work in Section IX.
The appendices contain all proofs.
II. OVERVIEW
We start with a simple example that illustrates the chal-
lenges of constructing local policies that cumulatively enforce
global access-control requirements. We also explain how our
framework is used, that is, we describe its inputs and outputs.
A. Running Example
Consider a small office space consisting of a lobby, a bureau,
a meeting room, and a corridor. The office layout is given in
Figure 2(a). Access within this physical space is secured using
electronic locks. Each door has a lock and a card reader. The
lock stores a policy that defines who can open the door from
the card reader’s side. The door can be opened by anyone from
the opposite side. We annotate locks with arrows in Figure 2(a)
to indicate the direction that the locks restrict access. For
example, the lock at the main entrance restricts who can access
the lobby, and it allows anyone to exit the office space from
the lobby. To open a door from the card reader’s side, a subject
presents a smartcard that stores the holder’s credentials. The
lock can access additional information, such as the current
time, needed to evaluate the policy. The lock opens whenever
the policy evaluates to grant.
The global requirements for this physical space are given
in Figure 2(b). The requirements R1, R3, and R4 define
permissions, while R2 and R5 define prohibitions. To meet
these requirements, the electronic locks must be configured
with appropriate local policies. As previously observed, this
is challenging because one must account for both spatial
constraints and all global access-control requirements. We
illustrate these points below.
Spatial Constraints. The layout of the physical space prevents
subjects from freely requesting access to any resource. For
example, the requirement R1 is not met just because the
meeting room’s lock grants access to visitors; the visitor must
also be able to enter the corridor from the outside. Such
constraints must be accounted for when defining the local
policies. To satisfy R1, we may for instance choose a path
Outside Lobby
Bureau
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entrance
(a) Floor plan (F marks security zones)
id= out
sec-zone= false
id= lob
sec-zone= false
id= cor
sec-zone= false
id= mr
sec-zone= false
id= bur
sec-zone= true
(c) Resource structure
R1: Visitors can access the meeting room between 8AM and 8PM.
R2: Visitors cannot access the meeting room if they have
not passed through the lobby.
R3: Employees can access the bureau between 8AM and 8PM.
R4: Employees can access the bureau at any time if they
enter their correct PIN.
R5: Non-employees cannot access security zones.
(b) Global requirements
((role = visitor) ∧ (8 ≤ time ≤ 20)) ⇒ GRANT(id = mr)
(role = visitor) ⇒ WAYPOINT(id = lob, id = mr)
((role = employee) ∧ (8 ≤ time ≤ 20))⇒ GRANT(id = bur)
((role = employee) ∧ correct-pin) ⇒ GRANT(id = bur)
(role 6= employee) ⇒ DENY(sec-zone = true)
(d) Formalized requirements
Synthesizer
out cor := (role 6= visitor) ∧ correct-pin cor bur := (role = employee) lob cor := (role 6= ⊥)
out lob := (8 ≤ time ≤ 20) cor mr := (role = visitor)
(e) Configuration assigning PEPs to local policies
Fig. 2: Synthesizing the local policies for our running example
from the main entrance to the meeting room and configure all
the locks along that path to grant access to visitors.
Global Requirements. Each global requirement typically has
multiple sets of local policies that satisfy it. The local policies
must however be constructed to ensure that all requirements
are satisfied simultaneously. For example, the requirement R1
is satisfied if the side-entrance lock and the meeting room
lock both grant access to visitors between 8AM and 8PM. It
can also be satisfied by ensuring that the main entrance, the
lobby, and the meeting room locks all grant access to visitors
between 8AM and 8PM. Granting visitors access through the
side entrance however violates the requirement R2, which
requires that visitors pass through the lobby. Hence, to meet
both requirements, the locks along the path through the lobby
must grant access to visitors between 8AM and 8PM, while
the side-entrance lock must always deny access to visitors.
B. Synthesis Framework
Figure 2(c-e) depicts our framework’s input and output for
our running example. The input is a model of the physical
space and a specification of its global requirements. The output
produced by our synthesizer is a set of local policies.
A physical space is modeled as a rooted directed graph
called a resource structure. We have depicted the root node in
gray. In our example, this corresponds to the public space that
surrounds the office space, e.g. public streets. The remaining
(non-root) nodes are the spaces inside the building. The locks
control access along the edges. A subject can traverse a
solid edge of the resource structure only if the lock’s policy
evaluates to grant, whereas any subject can follow the dashed
edges. Hence, the locks effectively enforce the grant-all policy
along the dashed edges. We use two attributes to label the
physical spaces: the attribute id represents room identifiers,
and sec-zone formalizes that a space is inside the security
zone.
Global requirements are specified using a declarative lan-
guage, called SPCTL. In Figure 2(d) we show the formal-
ization of our running example’s requirements in SPCTL.
For instance, R1, which states that visitors can access the
meeting room between 8AM and 8PM, is formalized as(
(role = visitor) ∧ (8 ≤ time ≤ 20)) ⇒ GRANT(id = mr).
This formalization instantiates SPCTL’s permission pattern
GRANT to state that there is a path from outside to the meeting
room such that every lock on the path grants access to any
visitor between 8AM and 8PM. We define SPCTL’s syntax
and semantics and present several patterns in Section IV.
Given these inputs, the synthesizer automatically constructs
a local policy for each lock. The synthesized policies are
attribute-based policies that collectively enforce the global re-
quirements. The synthesized policies for our running example
are given in Figure 2(e). We write, for example, cor bur
for the synthesized policy deployed at the bureau’s lock. This
policy (role = employee) grants access to subjects with the
role employee. We define the synthesis problem, and the syntax
and semantics of attribute-based local policies in Section V.
III. PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL
A. Basic notions
In this section, we formalize our system model for physical
access control. Our terminology is based, in part, on the
XACML reference architecture [5].
Each physical space is partitioned into finitely many en-
closed spaces and one open (public) space. We call the
enclosed spaces resources. Two spaces may be directly con-
nected with a gate, controlled by a policy enforcement point
(PEP). Examples of gates include doors, turnstiles, and se-
curity checkpoints. Each PEP has its own policy decision
point (PDP), which stores a local policy mapping access
requests to access decisions. Each access request consists of
subject credentials, which the PDP receives from the PEP, as
well as contextual attributes, if needed, obtained from policy
information points (PIPs). The PIPs are distributed information
sources that provide contextual attributes required by the PDP
for access decisions. Examples of PIPs include revocation list
servers and secure time servers.
To enter a space, a subject provides his credentials to the
PEP that controls the gate. The PEP forwards the subject’s
credentials to its PDP. The PDP, in turn, queries the PIP if
needed, evaluates the policy, and then forwards the access
decision — either grant or deny — to the PEP. The PEP then
enforces the PDP’s decision. See Figure 3.
We assume that access requests contain all relevant infor-
mation for making access decisions. PDPs can thus make
their decisions independent of past access requests. Hence it
has no bearing on our model whether the PDPs are actually
distributed or are realized through a centralized system. This is
desirable from a practical standpoint since PDPs and PIPs need
not be equipped with logging mechanisms. Moreover, different
PDPs and PIPs need not synchronize their local views on the
request history. In this sense they are autonomous entities.
The access requests and local policies we consider are
attribute based and may reference three kinds of attributes.
A subject attribute contains information about a subject. For
example, Alice’s organizational role and clearance level are
her subject attributes. Subjects can provide PEPs with their
attributes in the form of credentials. A contextual attribute
represents information about the security context provided by
a PIP, such as the list of revoked credentials and the current
time. We also introduce resource attributes, which represent
information about resources. For example, the attributes floor
and department may represent the floor of an office space
and the department it belongs to. We use resource attributes
to specify global requirements. They are however not needed
for expressing access requests or local policies in our model.
This is because the PDPs associated to any resource can be
hardwired with all the attributes of that resource. In this sense,
each PDP “knows” the space under its control.
Subject PEP
Credentials
Grant/Deny
PDP
Credentials
Grant/Deny
Policy
PIP
Attributes
Fig. 3: System model
Our system model targets electronic PEP/PDPs that can en-
force attribute-based policies and read digital credentials, e.g.
stored on smart cards and mobile phones. Manufacturers often
refer to these as smart locks [6]–[8]. In large physical access-
control systems, smart locks are rapidly replacing mechanical
locks and keys, which can only enforce simple, crude policies.
B. Formalization
We now formalize the above notions.
Attributes. Fix a finite set A of attributes and a set V
of attribute values. The domain function dom : A → P(V)
associates each attribute with the set of values it admits. For
instance, the current time attribute is associated with the set of
natural numbers, and the clearance level attribute is associated
with a fixed finite set of levels. We assume that any attribute
can take the designated value ⊥, representing the situation
where the attribute’s value is unknown. We partition the set of
attributes into subject attributes AS , contextual attributes AC ,
and resource attributes AR.
Access Requests. We represent an access request as a total
function that maps subject and contextual attributes to values
from their respective domains. This function is computed
by PDPs after receiving a subject’s credentials and querying
PIPs. For instance, the PDP maps the attribute role to visitor
when the subject’s credentials indicate this. It maps the at-
tribute correct-pin to true when the PIN entered through the
keypad attached to the PDP is correct. Finally, it maps the
contextual attribute time to 8 after querying a time server at
8AM. We denote the set of all access requests by Q.
A remark on set-valued attributes is due here. In some
settings, attributes take a finite set of values, as opposed to a
single value. For example, in role-based access control, a sub-
ject may activate multiple roles. The attribute role must then
be assigned with the set of all the activated roles. We account
for such set-valued attributes simply by defining a Boolean
attribute for each value; for example, we define role employee
and role manager. An access request q assigns true to both
Boolean attributes whenever a subject has activated both the
employee and the manager roles.
Local Policies. Local policies map access requests to grant or
deny. We extensionally define local policies as subsets of Q: a
local policy is defined as the set of requests that it grants. The
structure (P(Q),⊆,∩,∪, ∅,Q) is a complete lattice that orders
local policies by their permissiveness. The least permissive
policy, namely ∅, denies all access requests, and the most
permissive one, i.e. Q, grants them all. In section V-A, we will
intensionally define local policies as constraints over subject
id= out
sec-zone= false
id= lob
sec-zone= false
id= cor
sec-zone= false
id= mr
sec-zone= false
id= bur
sec-zone= true
Fig. 4: The double-lined edges denote the PEPs that deny the
access request q = {role 7→ visitor, time 7→ 10, correct-pin 7→
⊥}, given the configuration c from Figure 2. The resource
structure Sc,q is obtained by removing the double-lined edges
and nodes.
and contextual attributes. The local policies shown in Figure 2,
for example, are defined by such constraints.
Resource Structures. We now give a formal model of physi-
cal spaces. A resource structure is a tuple S = (R, E, re, L),
where R is a set of resources, E ⊆ R × R is an irreflexive
edge relation, re ∈ R is the entry resource, and L : R →
(AR → V) is a total function mapping resources to resource
attribute valuations. We assume that every resource r ∈ R is
reachable from the entry resource re, that is, (re, r) ∈ E∗,
where E∗ is the reflexive-transitive closure of E.
The edges in a resource structure model PEPs. The irreflex-
ivity of E captures the condition that once a subject enters
a physical space, he cannot re-enter the space before first
leaving it. We assume that resource structures do not contain
deadlocks. A resource r0 in S is a deadlock if there does
not exists an r1 such that (r0, r1) ∈ E. This assumption is
valid in physical-space access control: a deadlock resource
corresponds to a “black hole” that no one can leave. Note
that dead-end corridors are not deadlocks, provided one can
backtrack.
The entry resource re represents the public space and the
remaining resources denote enclosed spaces. A resource struc-
ture describes how subjects can access resources. A subject
accesses a resource along a path, which is a sequence of
resources connected by edges, starting from the entry resource.
For example, before entering a room in a hotel, a subject enters
the hotel’s lobby from the street, and then goes through the
corridor. Figure 2(c) gives an example of a resource structure.
Configurations. Each edge of a resource structure represents
a gate controlled by a local policy installed on the gate’s PDP.
We therefore define a configuration for a resource structure S
as a function that assigns to each edge of S a local policy. We
write CS for the set of all configurations for S. The set CS
is partially ordered under the relation vS , defined as: c vS c′
if for any edge e of S we have c(e) ⊆ c′(e). Namely, a
configuration is less permissive than another configuration if
for any edge the former assigns a less permissive local policy
than the latter.
We can now define which resources are accessible given
an access request and a configuration. For a resource struc-
ture S, a configuration c for S, and an access request q, we
define Sc,q as the resource structure obtained by removing all
the edges from S whose policies deny q, and then removing
all nodes that are not reachable from the entry resource. The
structure Sc,q’s entry resource is the same as S’s. To illustrate,
consider the resource structure S and the configuration c
given in Figure 2, and the access request q = {role 7→
visitor, time 7→ 10, correct-pin 7→ ⊥}. The side-entrance PEP
and the bureau PEP deny q and therefore these two edges are
removed from S. The node that represents the bureau is not
reachable from the entry resource and it is thus also removed.
In Figure 4 we depict the removed edges and nodes.
We remark that the structure Sc,q is defined for a fixed
access request q. Access requests, which assign values to
subject and contextual attributes, can however change, for
instance when a subject’s role is revoked or as time progresses.
We abstract away such changes in Sc,q’s definition. In our
running example, this amounts to assuming that a subject’s
role does not change during this time, and the time needed
to move through the office building is negligible compared to
the time needed for a subject’s access rights to change; for
example, the requirements R1-5 stipulate that subject’s access
rights may change only twice per day — at 8AM and at 8PM.
This abstraction corresponds to taking a snapshot of all the
attributes, and then computing Sc,q based on the snapshot. We
refer to these snapshots as sessions. Henceforth we interpret
global requirements and local policies in the context of such
sessions.
Interpreting requirements and polices in the context of a ses-
sion is justified for many practical scenarios. This is because,
in most practical settings, changes in subject and contextual
attributes are addressed through out-of-band mechanisms. To
illustrate, consider a subject who has the role visitor and enters
the meeting room of our running example at 3PM as permitted
by the system’s requirements. Now, suppose that the subject’s
visitor role is revoked at 4PM, or that the subject remains in the
meeting room until 10PM. No access-control system can force
the subject to leave. In practice, out-of-band mechanisms, such
as security guards, address such concerns.
In the following sections, we confine our attention to
configurations that do not introduce deadlocks. That is, we
consider those configurations c where for any q ∈ Q, the
structure Sc,q is deadlock-free. In Section IV-C, we describe
how this provision can be encoded as a global requirement.
IV. SPECIFYING REQUIREMENTS
In this section we define SPCTL, a simple declarative
language for specifying requirements. We give the language’s
syntax and semantics in Section IV-A. To simplify the specifi-
cation of global requirements, in Section IV-B we present four
requirement patterns that capture common access-control id-
ioms for physical spaces. Finally, in Section IV-C, we illustrate
the specification of two generic access-control requirements:
deny-by-default and deadlock-freeness.
a = c := a ∈ {c}
a 6= c := ¬(a = c)
abool := abool = true
anum ≤ n := anum ∈ {0, . . . , n}
anum ≥ n := ¬(anum ≤ n− 1)
n ≤ anum ≤ n′ := (anum ≥ n) ∧ (anum ≤ n′)
Fig. 5: Syntactic shorthands: a ∈ A is an attribute, anum ∈
Anum is a numeric attribute, abool ∈ Abool is a boolean
attribute, n, n′ ∈ N are natural numbers.
A. Requirement Specification Language
The design of SPCTL has been guided by real-world phys-
ical access-control requirements. Virtually all such require-
ments can be formalized as properties that specify which
physical spaces subjects can and cannot access, directly and
over paths, based on the security context and on the physical
spaces they have accessed. In our physical access-control
model, subjects choose which physical spaces to access, which
induces a branching structure over the spaces they access. We
therefore build our requirement specification language SPCTL
upon the computation tree logic (CTL) [9], whose branching
semantics is a natural fit for physical spaces.
Syntax. A requirement specified in SPCTL is a formula of
the form T ⇒ ϕ given by the following BNF:
T ::= true | as ∈ D | ac ∈ D | ¬T | T ∧ T
ϕ ::= true | ar ∈ D | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | EXϕ | AXϕ
| E[ϕUϕ] | A[ϕUϕ] .
Here as ∈ AS is a subject attribute, ac ∈ AC is a contextual
attribute, ar ∈ AR is a resource attribute, and D ⊆ V is a finite
subset of values. The formula T is a constraint over subject and
contextual attributes that defines the access requests to which
the requirement applies. We call T the target. The formula ϕ
is a CTL formula over resource attributes. It defines a path
property that must hold for all access requests to which the
requirement is applicable. We call ϕ an access constraint.
Note that additional Boolean and CTL operators can be
defined in the standard way. For example, we write false
for ¬true, and define the Boolean connectives ∨ and⇒ in the
standard manner using ¬ and ∧. We will later make use of
the CTL operators EFϕ, AGϕ, and A[ϕRψ], which are defined
as E[true U ϕ], ¬(EF¬ϕ), and ¬(E[¬ϕU¬ψ]), respectively.
Below we give intuitive explanations of EX, AX, EU, and AU,
which are standard CTL connectives.
The connectives exists-next EX and always-next AX con-
strain the physical spaces that a subject can access next. In
our running example, suppose that a subject has entered the
lobby. The subject can next enter the corridor or go to the
public space: these are immediately accessible from the lobby.
In the lobby, EXϕ states that the formula ϕ is true in at least
one of these “next” spaces. In contrast, AXϕ states that ϕ is
true both in the corridor and in the public space.
The operators exists-until EU and always-until AU relate
two access constraints ϕ1 and ϕ2 over paths. The for-
mula E[ϕ1Uϕ2] states that there exists a path that reaches a
S, r0 |= true
S, r0 |= a ∈ D if L(r0)(a) ∈ D
S, r0 |= ¬ϕ if S, r0 6|= ϕ
S, r0 |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if S, r0 |= ϕ1 and S, r0 |= ϕ2
S, r0 |= EXϕ if ∃(r0, r1, · · · ) ∈ S(r0). S, r1 |= ϕ
S, r0 |= AXϕ if ∀(r0, r1, · · · ) ∈ S(r0). S, r1 |= ϕ
S, r0 |= E[ϕ1Uϕ2] if ∃(r0, r1, · · · ) ∈ S(r0). ∃i ≥ 0.
S, ri |= ϕ2 ∧ ∀j ∈ [0, i). S, rj |= ϕ1
S, r0 |= A[ϕ1Uϕ2] if ∀(r0, r1, · · · ) ∈ S(r0). ∃i ≥ 0.
S, ri |= ϕ2 ∧ ∀j ∈ [0, i). S, rj |= ϕ1
Fig. 6: The relation |= between a resource structure S =
(R, E, re, L), a resource r0 ∈ R, and an access constraints ϕ.
resource r that satisfies ϕ2, and any resource prior to r on
the path satisfies ϕ1. We use this connective to formalize, for
example, waypointing requirements such as: visitors cannot
access the meeting room until they have accessed the lobby.
The formula A[ϕ1Uϕ2] states that every path reaches some
resource r that satisfies ϕ2, and that any resource prior to r
on the path satisfies ϕ1.
To simplify writing attribute constraints in SPCTL, we
introduce in Figure 5 abbreviations for numeric and boolean
attributes. Based on the attributes’ domains, we partition the
set of attributes A into numeric attributes Anum, boolean
attributes Abool, and enumerated attributes Aenum: An at-
tribute a is numeric if dom(a) = N ∪ {⊥}; it is boolean
if dom(a) = {false, true,⊥}; otherwise, it is enumerated and
dom(a) is finite. We may write anum or abool to emphasize
that an attribute a is numeric or boolean, respectively.
Semantics. We first inductively define the satisfaction rela-
tion ` between an access request q ∈ Q and a target:
q ` true
q ` a ∈ D if q(a) ∈ D
q ` ¬T if q 6` T
q ` T1 ∧ T2 if q ` T1 and q ` T2 .
A requirement T ⇒ ϕ is applicable to an access request q iff q
satisfies the target T , i.e. q ` T . For example, the requirement
(role = visitor) ⇒ ϕ is applicable to all access requests that
assign the value visitor to the subject attribute role.
Let S = (R, E, re, L) be a resource structure. A path of
S is an infinite sequence of resources (r0, r1, · · · ) such that
∀i ≥ 0. (ri, ri+1) ∈ E, and we denote the set of all paths
rooted at a resource r0 by S(r0). In Figure 6, we inductively
define the satisfaction relation |= between a resource structure,
a resource, and an access constraint. A resource structure S
with an entry resource re satisfies an access constraint ϕ,
denoted by S |= ϕ, iff S, re |= ϕ.
Definition 1. Let S be a resource structure, c a configuration
for S, and T ⇒ ϕ a requirement. S configured with c satisfies
T ⇒ ϕ, denoted by S, c  (T ⇒ ϕ), iff q ` T implies
Sc,q |= ϕ, for any access request q ∈ Q.
We extend  to sets of requirements as expected. Given a set
Pattern Shorthand Specification Description Intuitive Semantics
Permission T ⇒ GRANT(ϕ) T ⇒ EF ϕ T -requests can access ϕ-spaces. re ϕ3
Prohibition T ⇒ DENY(ϕ) T ⇒ AG(¬ϕ) T -requests cannot access ϕ-spaces. re ϕ7
Blocking T ⇒ BLOCK(ϕ,ψ) T ⇒ AG(ϕ⇒ AG(¬ψ)) T -requests cannot access a ψ-space af-
ter accessing a ϕ-space.
re ϕ ψ
7
Waypointing T ⇒ WAYPOINT(ϕ,ψ) T ⇒ A[ϕRψ] T -requests must access a ϕ-space be-
fore accessing a ψ-space. re ϕ ψ
7
Fig. 7: SPCTL Patterns: The entry resource re in the intuitive semantics is depicted using a gray rectangle. The arrows ϕ
3−→ ψ(
ϕ
7−→ ψ) indicate that there must (must not) exist a path from a ϕ-space to a ψ-space along which T -requests are granted.
of requirements R = {T1 ⇒ ϕ1, . . . , Tn ⇒ ϕn}, a resource
structure S configured with c satisfies R, denoted by S, c  R,
iff S, c  (Ti ⇒ ϕi) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We remark that resource structures can easily be represented
using standard Kripke structures [9] by mapping each resource
to a Kripke state and each resource attribute valuation to sets
of atomic propositions. The access constraints can be similarly
mapped to standard CTL formulas by translating attribute
constraints into propositional logic. Note however that while
Kripke structures are often used to represent changes of, say, a
concurrent system’s state over time, resource structures model
static physical spaces.
B. Requirement Patterns
SPCTL can be directly used to specify global requirements.
However, to illustrate its use and expressiveness, we present
the formalization of common physical access-control idioms.
We have studied the requirements of an airport, a corpo-
rate building, and a university campus to elicit the common
structure of physical access-control requirements. To distill
the basic requirement patterns, we split complex requirements
into their atomic parts. Our analysis revealed four common
patterns, which we formalize below. The first pattern abstracts
positive requirements, which stipulate that the access-control
system must grant certain access requests. The remaining three
patterns capture negative requirements, which stipulate that the
access-control system must deny certain access requests.
We use the following terminology when describing require-
ments. Given a target T , we call an access request q a T -
request if q ` T , i.e. q satisfies the target T . Given a resource
structure S and an access constraint ϕ, we say that a subject
can access a ϕ-space of S if the subject can access a physical
space r0 of S such that S, r0 |= ϕ, i.e. the space r0 satisfies the
access constraint ϕ. Our patterns are summarized in Figure 7.
Permission. The permission pattern abstracts requirements
stating that T -requests can access ϕ-spaces from the entry
resource. Permission requirements have the form T ⇒ (EF ϕ).
The exists-future operator EF formalizes that a ϕ-space is
reachable from the entry resource. For example, the require-
ment R3 stipulating that employees can access the bureau
between 8AM and 8PM is formalized as(
(role = employee) ∧ (8 ≤ time ≤ 20))⇒ EF (id = bur).
The target (role = employee) ∧ (8 ≤ time ≤ 20) formalizes
that this requirement is applicable only to access requests
made by visitors at times between 8AM and 8PM. The
access constraint EF(id = bur) is satisfied iff the resource
structure has a path from the entry resource to the bureau.
The requirements R1 and R4 of our running example are also
instances of the permission pattern.
Prohibition. Dual to the permission pattern, the prohibition
pattern captures requirements stating that T -access requests
cannot access a ϕ-space. Prohibition requirements have the
form T ⇒ AG(¬ϕ). The operator AG quantifies over all
paths reachable from the entry resource. An example taken
from our airport requirements is: Passengers cannot access
the departure gate zones without a boarding pass. Another
example is requirement R5, formalized as
(role 6= employee)⇒ AG(¬ sec-zone) .
The target role 6= employee is satisfied by access requests that
assign a value other than employee to the attribute role. The
access constraint AG(¬ sec-zone) is satisfied if no path leads
to a security zone.
Blocking. The blocking pattern captures requirements stating
that subjects cannot access a ψ-space after they have accessed
a ϕ-space. Intuitively, accessing a ϕ-space blocks the subject
from accessing ψ-spaces. At international airports, for exam-
ple, passengers may not access departure gate zones after they
have accessed the baggage claim. Blocking requirements have
the form T ⇒ AG(ϕ ⇒ AG(¬ψ)). The airport example is
formalized as:
(role = passenger)⇒ AG((zone = baggage-claim)
⇒ AG ¬(zone = departure)) .
This requirement instantiates the blocking pattern: the target T
is (role = passenger), and the two access constraints ψ and ϕ
are (zone = departure) and (zone = baggage-claim).
Waypointing. The waypointing pattern captures requirements
stipulating that subjects must first access a ϕ-space before
accessing a ψ-space. For example, passengers cannot access
an airport’s terminal before they have passed through a security
check. This is a negative requirement that restricts how passen-
gers can access the terminal. Waypointing requirements have
the form T ⇒ (A[ϕRψ]). The globally-release operator AR
quantifies over all paths from the entry resource and formalizes
that if ψ holds at some point, then ϕ was valid at least once
beforehand. The requirement R2 of our running example is an
instance of the waypointing pattern and is formalized as
(role = visitor)⇒ A[(id = lob)R(id = mr)] .
The target specifies that this requirement applies to all access
requests made by visitors. The access constraint is satisfied if
all paths to the meeting room go through the lobby.
The four idioms just described cover all the requirements
that arose in the case studies that we report on in Sec-
tion VII-B. We remark though that there are global re-
quirements that are not instances of these four patterns. For
example, in corporate buildings, a subject must be able to
access the parking lot if he or she has access to an office.
Although this requirement cannot be expressed using the above
patterns, it can be directly formalized in SPCTL as follows:
true⇒ ((EF(zone = office))⇒ (EF(id = parking-lot))) .
In general, as SPCTL supports all CTL operators, it can specify
any branching property expressible in CTL.
C. Generic Requirements
We now describe two commonly-used generic requirements.
Deny-by-default. The deny-by-default principle stipulates
that if an access request can be denied without violating
the requirements, then it should be denied; cf. [10]. Security
engineers often follow this principle to avoid overly permissive
local policies. To illustrate, consider our running example and
imagine that the role intern is contained in the domain of
the attribute role. The requirements given in Figure 2(b) do
not prohibit an intern from accessing, say, the meeting room.
However, denying interns access to the meeting room is also
compliant with these requirements.
The following requirement, called deny-by-default, instan-
tiates the above principle: If no positive requirement is ap-
plicable to an access request, then only the entry space is
accessible to the subject who makes such a request. To for-
malize this requirement, we first define positive and negative
requirements. Let c and c′ be two configurations for a given
resource structure S. A requirement T ⇒ ϕ is positive if
S, c  (T ⇒ ϕ) and c vS c′ imply S, c′  (T ⇒ ϕ).
A requirement T ⇒ ϕ is negative if S, c  (T ⇒ ϕ) and
c′ vS c imply S, c′  (T ⇒ ϕ). Intuitively, if a configuration
satisfies a positive (negative) requirement, then any more
(less) permissive configuration also satisfies the requirement.
We remark that although not all requirements are positive
or negative, most real-world requirements are, including all
requirements specified in this paper.
Let R be a set of requirements that contains only positive
and negative requirements, and let {T1 ⇒ ϕ), · · · , Tn ⇒ ϕn}
be the set of all positive requirements contained in R. The
deny-by-default requirement for R is
(¬T1) ∧ · · · ∧ (¬Tn)⇒ AX (id = entry) .
Here we assume that L(re)(id) = entry, i.e. the entry resource
re is labeled with entry. Adding this requirement to our
running example’s requirements would ensure that an intern
cannot access, e.g., the meeting room.
Deadlock-freeness. A deadlock-freeness requirement stipu-
lates that there are no deadlocks in a system, i.e. resources
that a subject can access and then never leave. For example,
the meeting room of our running example would be a deadlock
if visitors could enter it, but never leave. As discussed in
our system model, local policies that introduce deadlocks are
undesirable.
Formally, the deadlock-freeness requirement is defined as:
true⇒ AG EX true .
This requirement applies to all access requests. The access
constraint AG EX true states that for any resource a subject
can access, there is a resource that the subject can access
next. A resource structure S and a configuration c satisfy this
requirement iff for any access requests q ∈ Q, Sc,q has no
deadlocks.
V. POLICY SYNTHESIS PROBLEM
We now define the policy synthesis problem. We show that
this problem is decidable but NP-hard.
A. Problem
Definition 2. The policy synthesis problem is as follows:
Input. A resource structure S and a set of require-
ments R.
Output. A configuration c such that S, c  R, if such a
configuration exists, and unsat otherwise.
The synthesized configuration defines the local policies to
be deployed at the PEPs. Recall that a policy is extensionally
defined as the set of access requests for which the PEP grants
access. As such a set may, in general, be infinite, one cannot
simply output an extensional definition of the synthesized
configuration. We therefore define local policies intensionally
by constraints over subject and contextual attributes, expressed
in the same language that we specify requirement targets
in Section IV. The semantics of an intensional local policy
P is then simply λq. if q ` P then grant else deny. Figure 2
illustrates the input and output to the policy synthesis problem
for our running example.
An example of a local policy defined over the attributes
role and time is (role = visitor)∧ (8 ≤ time ≤ 20). This local
policy grants all access requests that assign the value visitor
to the attribute role and a number between 8 and 20 to the
attribute time. Note that this local policy is also the target of
requirement R1.
B. Decidability
To show that the policy synthesis problem is decidable,
we give a synthesis algorithm, called Scs, that uses controller
synthesis as a subroutine. In the following, we first define the
controller synthesis problem. We then show how the algorithm
Scs constructs the PEPs’ local policies by solving multiple
controller synthesis instances.
Controller Synthesis Problem. Controller synthesis algo-
rithms take as input a description of an uncontrolled sys-
tem, called a plant, along with a specification, and output a
controller that restricts the plant so that it satisfies the given
specification. In our setting, the plant is the resource structure
and the specification is an access constraint, i.e. a CTL
formula over resource attributes. The synthesized controller
then defines which PEPs must grant or deny the access request
so that the access constraint is satisfied. For simplicity, we do
not define the controller synthesis problem in its most general
form. For our needs the following simpler definition suffices.
Definition 3. The controller synthesis problem is as follows:
Input. A resource structure S = (R, E, re, L) and an
access constraint ϕ.
Output. A set E′ ⊆ E of edges such that (R, E′, re, L) |=
ϕ, if such an E′ exists, and unsat otherwise.
The controller synthesis problem can be reduced to synthe-
sizing a memoryless controller for a Kripke structure given
a CTL specification. Deciding whether a controller synthesis
instance has a solution is NP-complete [11]. Systems such
as MBP [12] can be used to synthesize controllers. For a
comprehensive overview of controller synthesis see [13].
Algorithm. The algorithm Scs is based on two insights. First,
for a given access request q, we can use controller synthesis
to identify which PEPs must grant or deny q. In more detail,
we can compute (R, E′, re, L) |= ϕq , where ϕq conjoins all
access constraints of the requirements that are applicable to q.
The edges in E′ represent the PEPs that must grant q and those
in E \E′ the PEPs that must deny q. A configuration can thus
be synthesized by solving one controller synthesis instance
for each access request. However, there are infinitely many
access requests. Our second insight is that we can construct
a configuration by solving finitely many controller synthesis
instances. We partition the set Q of access requests into 2|R|
equivalence classes, where two access requests are equivalent
if the same set of requirements are applicable to them. Solving
one controller synthesis instance for one representative access
request per equivalence class is sufficient for our purpose.
The main steps of the algorithm Scs are given in Algo-
rithm 1. The algorithm iteratively constructs a configuration c
as follows. Initially, it sets all local policies to true (lines 2-
3). The algorithm iterates over all subsets R′ = {T1 ⇒
ϕ1, . . . , Ti ⇒ ϕi} of the requirements R (line 4). The conjunc-
tion T = T1∧· · ·∧Ti∧¬Ti+1∧· · · ¬Tn constructed at line 5 is
satisfied by all access requests to which only the requirements
contained in R′ are applicable. The set {q ∈ Q | q ` T}
is an equivalence class of access requests. If this equivalence
class is nonempty, i.e. ∃q ∈ Q. q ` T , then c must grant and
deny all access requests contained in it in conformance with
the access constraints defined by R′. Lines 9-14 define how
the algorithm Scs updates c. First, it constructs the conjunction
ϕ of the access constraints defined by the requirement in R′.
It then executes the controller synthesis algorithm, denoted
by cs, with the inputs S and ϕ. If the algorithm cs returns
Algorithm 1: The algorithm Scs for synthesizing policies
using controller synthesis. The controller synthesis algo-
rithm, denoted cs(S, ϕ), outputs either a subset of E or
unsat.
Input: Resource stricture S = (R, E, re, L),
a set of requirements R
Output: A configuration c or unsat
1 begin
2 for e ∈ E do
3 c(e)← true
4 for R′ ⊆ R do
5 T ← T1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ti ∧ ¬Ti+1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬Tn, where
6 {T1 ⇒ ϕ1, . . . , Ti ⇒ ϕi} = R′ and
7 {Ti+1 ⇒ ϕi+1, . . . , Tn ⇒ ϕn} = R \R′
8 if ∃q ∈ Q. q ` T then
9 ϕ← ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕi
10 if cs(S, ϕ) = unsat then
11 return unsat
12 else
13 for e ∈ E \ cs(S, ϕ) do
14 c(e)← c(e) ∧ (¬T )
15 return c
unsat, then the requirements are not satisfiable for the given
resource structure, and the algorithm Scs thus returns unsat.
Otherwise, the algorithm cs returns a set E′ ⊆ E of edges. The
algorithm updates the configuration c as follows: for any edge
in E \ E′, the configuration is modified to deny access to all
requests in the equivalence class defined by R′. The algorithm
terminates when all subsets of the global requirements have
been considered.
Theorem 1. Let S be a resource structure and R a set of
requirements. If Scs(S,R) = c then S, c  R. If Scs(S,R) =
unsat then there is no configuration c such that S, c  R.
We prove this theorem and give the complexity of Scs in
Appendix A.
Example. To illustrate Scs, consider our running example and
the requirements R2 and R5 formalized as follows:
R2 := (role = visitor)⇒ (A[(id = lob) R (id = mr)])
R5 := (role 6= employee)⇒ (AG ¬ sec-zone) .
We remark that dom(role) = {⊥, visitor, employee}, and
therefore the targets role = visitor and role 6= employee are
not equivalent. To synthesize a configuration, the algorithm
Scs executes the second for-loop four times. Let the selected
subset of requirements in the first iteration be {R2,R5}. The
conjunction T of the targets is (role = visitor) ∧ (role 6=
employee), which is equivalent to (role = visitor). Hence, T
is satisfiable. The access constraint ϕ (see Algorithm 1, line
9) is then (A[(id = lob) R (id = mr)]) ∧ (AG ¬ sec-zone). A
possible output by the controller synthesis algorithm cs(S, ϕ)
is E\{(cor, bur), (out, cor)}. The updated configuration c after
the first iteration is therefore
c(e) =
 true ∧ role 6= visitor if e = (cor, bur)true ∧ role 6= visitor if e = (out, cor)
true otherwise .
Suppose the outputs to the remaining three controller synthesis
instances are cs(S, ϕ{R2}) = E \ {(out, cor)}, cs(S, ϕ{R5}) =
E \ {(cor, bur)}, and cs(S, ϕ∅) = E, where ϕX denotes the
conjunction of the access constraints of the requirements in
X . The simplified configuration c returned by Scs is
c(e) =
 role = employee if e = (cor, bur)role 6= visitor if e = (out, cor)
true otherwise .
Limitations. The main limitation of the algorithm Scs is that
the running time is exponential in the number of requirements,
rendering it impractical for nontrivial instances of policy syn-
thesis. For example, while the algorithm Scs takes 2 seconds
to synthesize a configuration for our running example, it does
not terminate within an hour for our case studies, reported in
Section VII-B. We give a practical policy synthesis algorithm
based on SMT solving in Section VI.
C. NP-hardness
To show NP-hardness, we reduce propositional satisfiability
to the policy synthesis problem. It is easy to see that a
propositional formula ϕ can be encoded, in logarithmic space,
as a target Tϕ over Boolean attributes. Consider the policy
synthesis problem for the inputs S and {(Tϕ ⇒ false)}, where
S is an arbitrary resource structure. If the output to this policy
synthesis instance is unsat then for some access request q, we
have q ` Tϕ. Hence ϕ is satisfiable. Alternatively, the output
to the policy synthesis problem is a configuration c. Since for
any access request q where q ` Tϕ we have Sc,q |= false, it is
immediate that there is no access request q such that q ` Tϕ.
Therefore, ϕ is unsatisfiable.
VI. POLICY SYNTHESIS ALGORITHM
In this section, we define our policy synthesis algorithm
based on SMT solving, called Ssmt. The algorithm takes as
input a resource structure S, a set R of requirements, and a
set C of configurations. The set C is encoded symbolically, as
we describe shortly. The algorithm outputs a configuration c
such that S, c  R, if there is such a configuration in C;
otherwise, it returns unsat. To synthesize a configuration c,
the algorithm encodes the question ∃c ∈ C. S, c  R in a
decidable logic supported by standard SMT solvers. Due to
its technical nature, we relegate a detailed description of the
encoding to the end of this section.
Our algorithm takes as input a set of configurations, and we
refer to the symbolic encoding of this set as a configuration
template. The configuration template enables us to restrict
the search space: the algorithm confines its search to the
configurations described by the template. Our algorithm Ssmt
is sound, independent of the provided configuration template.
Its completeness, however, depends on the template. We show
that one can construct a template for which Ssmt is complete,
but the resulting template would, in practice, encode so many
configurations that the resulting SMT problem would be
infeasible to solve. We therefore strike a balance between the
algorithm’s completeness and its efficiency: since real-world
local policies often have small syntactic representations, as
demonstrated by our experiments in Section VII, our policy
synthesis tool starts with a template that defines configurations
with succinct local policies, and iteratively executes Ssmt,
increasing the template’s size in each iteration. It turns out that
in our case studies a small number of iterations is sufficient to
synthesize all local policies. Below, we describe the algorithm
Ssmt’s components.
A. Configuration Templates
A configuration template assigns to each edge of the re-
source structure a symbolic encoding of a set of local policies.
To illustrate this encoding, consider the set of local policies
{true, role = employee, role 6= visitor}. We symbolically
encode this set for an edge, say (cor, bur), as a constraint
over subject and contextual attributes, as well as a control
variable z(cor,bur):
C((cor, bur)) = (z(cor,bur) = 1 ⇒ true) ∧
(z(cor,bur) = 2 ⇒ role = employee) ∧
(z(cor,bur) = 3 ⇒ role 6= visitor) .
(T1)
The control variable z(cor,bur) encodes the choice of one of
three local policies for the edge (cor, bur). Hence, for this
example, the set of configurations defined by the configuration
template contains 3|E| elements, where E is the set of edges
in the resource structure. Note that for a set of local policies
of size n (here n = 3), dlog ne propositional variables are
sufficient for representing each edge’s control variables. To
avoid clutter, we will write Cr0,r1 for C((r0, r1)).
We remark that configuration templates can be used to
restrict the search space of configurations to those that satisfy
attribute availability constraints, which restrict the set of
attributes that PEPs can retrieve. Suppose that only the side-
entrance door of our running example is equipped with a
keypad. To account for this constraint, we will restrict the
configurations in the template to those that use the correct-pin
attribute only in the local policy of side entrance’s lock.
B. Algorithm
The main steps of Ssmt are given in Algorithm 2. We
describe the algorithm with an example: the input to the algo-
rithm consists of the resource structure and the requirements
R2 and R5 of our running example, along with the above
configuration template C, which maps edges to the set of
local policies {true, role = employee, role 6= visitor}. The
algorithm starts by creating for each requirement a constraint
that asserts the satisfaction of the requirement in the resource
structure, given the template. This constraint is called ψ in
the algorithm, and is expressed in the logic of an SMT solver.
This step is implemented by the subroutine ENCODE, defined
in Figure 8. To encode the satisfaction of access constraints,
we follow the standard model-checking algorithm for CTL
Algorithm 2: The algorithm Ssmt for synthesizing policies
using SMT solving.
Input: A resource structure S = (R, E, r, L),
a set {R1, · · · , Rn} of requirements,
a configuration template C
Output: A configuration c or unsat
1 begin
2 φ← true
3 for R ∈ {R1, · · · , Rn} do
4 ψ ← ENCODE(S,R,C)
5 φ← φ ∧ ψ
6 if (∃~z.∀~a. φ) is sat then
7 M← MODEL(∃~z.∀~a. φ)
8 for e ∈ E do
9 c(e)← DERIVE(C(e),M)
10 return c
11 else
12 return unsat
based on labeling [14]; we explain this encoding at the end of
this section.
As an example, the result of ENCODE(S,R2, C), after
straightforward simplifications, is the following constraint:
ψR2 := role = visitor⇒ (¬Cout,cor ∨ ¬Ccor,mr) .
Here role is an attribute variable, originating from R2’s
target, and Cout,cor and Ccor,mr are the symbolic encodings
of the local policies for the edges (out, cor) and (cor,mr),
respectively. This constraint states that if the requirement’s
target role = visitor is satisfied, then one of the PEPs along the
path that starts at the entry resource and reaches the meeting
room directly through the corridor must deny access. Similarly,
ENCODE(S,R5, C) returns the constraint:
ψR5 := role 6= employee⇒
((¬Cout,cor ∨ ¬Ccor,bur)
∧ (¬Cout,lob ∨ ¬Clob,cor ∨ ¬Ccor,bur)) .
This states that any access request that maps the attribute role
to a value other than employee must be denied by at least one
PEP along the path to the bureau that goes directly through
the corridor, and moreover it must be denied by at least one
PEP along the path that passes through the lobby.
The conjunction of the constraints created for all the re-
quirements is called φ in Algorithm 2. To check whether
there is a configuration in C that satisfies the requirements,
the algorithm calls an SMT solver to find a model for the
formula ∃~z.∀~a. φ. Here this is
∃~z.∀~a. (ψR2 ∧ ψR5) ,
where ~z and ~a consist, respectively, of all the control and
attribute variables. If φ is unsatisfiable, then no configuration
in C satisfies the requirements. In this case, the algorithm
returns unsat. If however the formula is satisfiable, then the
ENCODE(S, T ⇒ ϕ,C) returns T ⇒ τ(ϕ, re)
Rewrite rules τ(ϕ, r0) :
τ(true, r0) ↪→ true
τ(a ∈ D, r0) ↪→
 true if L(r0)(a) ∈ Dfalse otherwise
τ(¬ϕ, r0) ↪→ ¬τ(ϕ, r0)
τ(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, r0) ↪→ τ(ϕ1, r0) ∧ τ(ϕ2, r0)
τ(EXϕ, r0) ↪→ ∃r1∈E(r0).
(
Cr0,r1 ∧ τ(ϕ, r1)
)
τ(AXϕ, r0) ↪→ ∀r1∈E(r0).
(
Cr0,r1 ⇒ τ(ϕ, r1)
)
τ(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0) ↪→ τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, ∅)
τ(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0) ↪→ τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, ∅)
Rewrite rules τU(ϕ, r0, X), with X ⊆ R :
τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X) ↪→ τ(ϕ2, r0) ∨
(
τ(ϕ1, r0)∧(∃r1∈E(r0)\X. Cr0,r1 ∧ τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1, X∪{r0})))
τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X) ↪→ τ(ϕ2, r0) ∨
(
τ(ϕ1, r0)∧(∀r1∈E(r0)\X. Cr0,r1⇒τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1, X∪{r0}))∧(∀r1∈E(r0)∩X. ¬Cr0,r1))
Fig. 8: Encoding the satisfaction of a requirement T ⇒ ϕ in
a resource structure S = (R, E, re, L), given a template C,
into an SMT constraint. The rewrite rules τ reduce an access
constraint ϕ and a resource r0 to an SMT constraint. For a
resource r0 ∈ R, we write E(r0) for {r1 ∈ R | (r0, r1) ∈ E}.
The ∃ and ∀ quantifiers range over a finite domain. Therefore,
the former can be expanded as a finite number of disjunctions,
and the latter as a finite number of conjunctions.
SMT solver returns a model of the formula, which instantiates
all the control variables (but not the attribute variables since
they are universally quantified). We refer to the SMT solver’s
procedure that returns such a model as MODEL in Algorithm 2.
The modelM generated by the SMT solver in effect identifies
the local policy for each edge e: by instantiating the control
variables in C(e), we obtain e’s local policy; see template T1.
This procedure is called DERIVE(C(e),M) in the algorithm.
For our example, a model M that satisfies ∃~z.∀~a. (ψR2 ∧
ψR5) maps z(cor,bur) to 2, z(out,cor) to 3, and all other control
variables to 1. It is then evident from template T1 that, e.g.,
the local policy for the edge (cor, bur) is (role = employee).
Complexity. Let S be a resource structure, R be a set of
requirements, and C be configuration template. The running
time of the Ssmt algorithm is determined by the size of the
generated formula φ and the complexity of finding a model
of φ. The size of the formula φ is in O(d · |R| · |R|), where d
is the size of the largest access constraint that appears in the
requirements, R is the set of requirements, and R is the set of
resources in S. The formula φ is defined over Boolean control
variables ~z and attribute variables ~a. The number of control
and attribute variables is dlog(|C|)e and |A|, respectively. In
the worst case, one must check all possible models of the
formula φ, so finding a model of φ is in O(2dlog(|C|)e+k·|A|),
where k is the largest domain that appears in the constraints.
Note that such domains are always finite. For example, time ≥
10 is a shorthand for ¬(time ∈ {0, . . . , 9}). We conclude
that the overall running time of the algorithm Ssmt is in
O(2dlog(|C|)e+k·|A| + d · |R| · |R|).
C. Soundness and Completeness
The algorithm Ssmt is sound.
Theorem 2. Let S be resource structure, R a set of require-
ments, and C a configuration template. If Ssmt(S,R,C) = c
then S, c  R. If Ssmt(S,R,C) = unsat, then there is no
configuration c in C such that S, c  R.
Ssmt’s completeness depends on the template C provided
as input to the algorithm. We show that one can construct
a template for which the algorithm is complete. A template
C is complete for a given resource structure S and set of
requirements R if Ssmt(S,R,C) returns a configuration when-
ever there is a configuration that satisfies the requirements.
For the algorithm’s completeness, it is in fact sufficient to
start the algorithm with a template CS,R that contains all the
configurations that the algorithm based on controller synthesis,
described in Section A, may output. The following theorem
formalizes this observation.
Theorem 3. Given a resource structure S and a set R of
requirements, the configuration template CS,R is complete for
S and R.
The number of configurations in CS,R is exponential in
|E| and |R| (which we prove in [15]). Hence this template,
although complete, is not useful in practice as it would
overwhelm SMT solvers, rendering Ssmt ineffective. In Sec-
tion VII-A, where we explain our implementation in detail,
we describe a configuration template that works well for
synthesizing configurations for practically-relevant examples.
We conclude this discussion by pointing out that our
synthesis algorithm can be readily used to verify whether a
candidate configuration c satisfies a set R of global access-
control requirements in a resource structure S. Namely, if
the configuration template input to Ssmt consists only of the
configuration c, then Ssmt returns c if S, c |= R; otherwise, the
algorithm returns unsat, which means that the configuration c
does not satisfy R.
D. Encoding into SMT
We now explain Algorithm 2’s procedure ENCODE, which
translates a resource structure S, a requirement R = (T ⇒ ϕ),
and a configuration template C, into an SMT constraint T ⇒
τ(ϕ, re). The generated constraint encodes that whenever the
requirement T ⇒ ϕ is applicable to an access request q, i.e.
q ` T , then ϕ must be satisfied for the entry resource re in
the structure Sc,q . Here, c is the configuration selected from
the template C. The constraint τ(ϕ, re) is generated using the
rewrite rules τ as defined in Figure 8.
Given an access constraint ϕ and a resource r0, the rewrite
rules τ produce an SMT constraint τ(ϕ, r0) that encodes
S, r0 |= ϕ; see Figure 6. The rewrite rules for access
constraints of the form true, a ∈ D, ¬ϕ, and ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 are
as expected. The rewrite rule for access constraints of the
form EXϕ encodes that the access constraint ϕ is satisfied
at r0 if there is an edge from r0 to some node r1 such that
Cr0,r1 holds and S, r1 |= ϕ. In this rule, the constraint Cr0,r1
returns the symbolic encoding of the local policies for the
edge (r0, r1), and τ(ϕ, r1) returns the encoding of S, r1 |= ϕ
as an SMT constraint. In contrast to EX, the rewrite rule for
AXϕ access constraints states that for any resource r1, such
that (r0, r1) ∈ E, if Cr0,r1 is true then the constraint τ(ϕ, r1)
is satisfied.
To encode the semantics of the connectives EU (AU), we
use the until rewrite rules τU, which reduce an until construct
E[ϕ1Uϕ2] (A[ϕ1Uϕ2]), a resource r0 ∈ R, and a set of
resources X ⊆ R to an SMT constraint. We use the set of
resources X to record for which resources the satisfaction of
the until access constraint has already been encoded. This is
necessary to guarantee the reduction system’s termination. The
rule for access constraints of the form E[ϕ1Uϕ2] encodes that
either S, r0 |= ϕ2, or S, r0 |= ϕ1 and there is an edge from r0
to some node r1 such that Cr0,r1 holds and S, r1 |= E[ϕ1Uϕ2].
Here τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1, X ∪ {r0}) returns the encoding of
S, r1 |= E[ϕ1Uϕ2]. Note that we add r0 to X to ensure
that no resource is revisited during EU-rewriting. Similarly,
the rule for access constraints A[ϕ1Uϕ2] encodes that either
S, r0 |= ϕ2, or S, r0 |= ϕ1 holds, for any outgoing edge to a
node r1 we have S, r1 |= A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and it has no outgoing
edges to nodes in X . We illustrate the encoding with examples
in Appendix B. There, we also prove that this rewrite system
always terminates, and the generated SMT encoding of access
constraints is correct.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We report on an implementation of our policy synthesis
algorithm, the case studies we conducted to evaluate its
efficiency and scalability, and our empirical results.
A. Implementation
We have implemented a synthesizer that encodes policy
synthesis instances into the QF LIA and QF UA logics of
SMT-LIB v2 [16] and uses the Z3 SMT solver [17]. Our
synthesizer is configured with configuration templates of dif-
ferent sizes. The local policies defined by these configuration
templates are in disjunctive normal form. Namely, the local
policies are defined as a disjunction of clauses, each clause
consisting of a conjunction of terms, where each term is either
an equality constraint for non-numerical attributes (e.g. role =
employee) or an interval constraint for numeric attributes (e.g.
t1 ≤ time ≤ t2). We denote by Ck the configuration template
that defines local policies with k clauses, each consisting of k
terms. Note that the local policies defined in the template Ck
may refer to at most k2 attributes.
Our synthesizer implements the following procedure:
it iteratively executes Ssmt(S,R,C1), Ssmt(S,R,C2),
Ssmt(S,R,C3), . . ., stopping with the first call to Ssmt
that returns a satisfying configuration, and returning this
configuration. By iterating over templates increasing in
size, our synthesizer generates small local policies, which
is desirable for avoiding redundant attribute checks. For
the running example, for instance, our synthesizer’s output
includes the constraint correct-pin only for the entrance gates’
local policies, and does not include this check, e.g., for the
office room’s policy. A satisfying solution for each case study
can be found in the configuration template C3. This indicates
that real-world local policies have concise representations.
Note that our synthesizer may not terminate in a reasonable
amount of time if no configuration satisfies the global require-
ments for the given resource structure. In our case studies, we
used a simple iterative method to pinpoint such unsatisfiable
requirements: we start with a singleton set of requirements,
consisting of one satisfiable requirement, and iteratively extend
this set by one requirement. This helped us identify a minimal
set of conflicting requirements and revise problematic ones.
B. Case Studies
To investigate Ssmt’s efficiency and scalability, we have
conducted case studies in collaboration with KABA AG. We
used real-world requirements and resource structures, and used
our tool to synthesize policy configurations for a university
building, a corporate building, and an airport terminal. Our
synthesizer and all data are publicly available1. Below, we
briefly explain the three case studies; relevant complexity
metrics are summarized in Table I.
University Building. We modeled the main floor of
ETH Zurich’s computer science building. This floor consists
of 66 subspaces including labs, offices, meeting rooms, and
shared areas. The subspaces are labeled with four attributes
that indicate: the research group to which a physical space is
assigned, the physical space type (e.g., office, teaching room,
or server room), the room number, and whether the physical
spaces belongs to a secretary or a faculty member. Example
requirements stipulate that a research group’s PhD students can
access all offices assigned to the group except those assigned to
the faculty members and secretaries. The policies are defined
over eight attributes.
Corporate Building. We modeled an office space that consists
of 20 subspaces, including a lobby, meeting rooms, offices, and
restricted areas such as a server room, a mail room, and an HR
office. The rooms are connected by three corridors, and they
are labeled with attributes to mark public areas and employee-
only zones. Access to these spaces is controlled by locks that
are equipped with smartcard readers and PIN keypads. These
locks are connected to a time server. Example requirements
are that only the postman and HR employees can access the
1http://www.infsec.ethz.ch/research/software/spctl.html
University Corporate Airport
building building terminal
Complexity Requirements 14 10 15
metrics PEPs 127 41 32
Subspaces 66 20 13
Performance Synthesis time 10.32 25.30 1.92
Std. dev. 0.04 0.15 0.01
TABLE I: Complexity metrics and policy synthesis times (in
seconds) for the three cases studies
mail room, and that between noon and 1PM employees can
access their offices without entering their PIN. The policies
are defined over four attributes.
Airport Terminal. We modeled the main terminal of a major
international airport. The part of the terminal that we modeled
includes subspaces such as the boarding pass control, security,
and shopping areas. We have used the actual plan of the termi-
nal, and considered 15 requirements, all currently enforced by
the airport’s access-control system. The area is divided into 13
subspaces, each labeled with zone identifiers (such as check-in
and passport control). Example requirements stipulate that no
passenger can access departure areas before passing through
security, passengers with economy boarding passes cannot
pass through the business/first-class ticket-control gates, and
that only airport staff can access certain elevators.
C. Empirical Results
We ran all experiments on a Linux machine with a quad-
code i7-4770 CPU, 32GB of RAM, running Z3 SMT v4.4.0.
We present two sets of results: (1) the synthesizer’s perfor-
mance when used to synthesize the local policies for the three
case studies, and (2) the synthesizer’s scalability.
Performance. We used our tool to synthesize the local
policies for the three case studies, measuring the time taken
for policy synthesis. We report the average synthesis time,
measured over 10 runs of the synthesizer, in the bottom two
rows of Table I. The reported synthesis time is the sum of
the time taken for encoding the policy synthesis instance
into SMT constraints, the time for solving the generated
SMT constraints, and the time for iterating over the smaller
templates for which the synthesizer returns unsat. In all three
case studies, our tool synthesizes the local policies in less than
30 seconds. The standard deviation is under 0.2 seconds. This
indicates that synthesizing local policies is practical, and can
be used for real-world systems.
Scalability Experiments. To investigate the scalability of
our synthesis tool, we synthetically generated larger problem
instances based on the corporate building case study. Although
the case study originally consisted of a single floor, we
increased the number of the floors in the building. We kept the
same labeling for the newly added subspaces, so the original
requirements also pertain to the newly added floors. Based on
this method, we scaled the number of PEPs up to 650.
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Fig. 9: Scaling the number of PEPs
The time needed to synthesize local policies for different
numbers of PEPs is given in Figure 9. The results show that
our tool can synthesize a large number of local policies in
a reasonable amount of time. For example, synthesizing up
to 500 local policies takes less than five hours. The tool’s
performance can be further improved using domain-specific
heuristics for solving the resulting SMT constraints. Never-
theless, the tool already scales to most real-world scenarios:
protected physical spaces usually have less than 500 PEPs.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Physical Access Control. The Grey project was an ex-
periment in deploying a physical access-control system at
the campus of Carnegie Mellon University [18], [19]. As
part of this project, researchers developed formal languages
for specifying policies and credentials, and also developed
techniques for detecting policy misconfigurations [3], [20].
The work on credential management, such as delegation, is
orthogonal to the specification of the locks’ local policies. In
contrast to their work on detecting policy misconfigurations,
we have developed a framework to synthesize policies that
are guaranteed to enforces the global requirements, avoiding
misconfigurations.
Several researchers have investigated SAT-based and model-
checking techniques for reasoning about physical access con-
trol [1], [2]. Similarly to our work, these approaches model
spatial constraints, and formalize global requirements that
physical access-control systems must enforce. The authors
of [1], for instance, model physical spaces using directed
graphs and formalize global requirements in first-order logic.
Their goal is to identify undesired denials due to blocked paths
and unintended grants to restricted zones using SAT solvers.
In contrast to these verification approaches, we develop a
synthesis framework for generating correct local policies.
Network Policy Synthesis. The problems of configuring
networks with access-control and routing policies are related
to the problem of constructing local policies from global
requirements. In the network problem domain, one has an
explicit resource structure defined by the network topology and
must enforce global requirements using local rules deployed at
the switches. Several synthesis algorithms for networks have
been studied; e.g. see [21]–[27]. The authors of [21] and [22],
for example, propose techniques for synthesizing local firewall
rules that collectively enforce global network requirements in
a given network topology. These approaches are sufficiently
expressive for formalizing simple connectivity constraints,
such as which hosts can access which services in a network.
Similarly to our approach, recent techniques for synthesizing
network configurations, such as [23]–[26], also leverage SAT
and SMT solvers. In addition to access-control constraints,
these techniques also consider business constraints, such as
deployment cost and usability. However, none of the above
approaches for network synthesis supports branching proper-
ties, which are necessary for specifying requirements such as
those stipulating that a fire-exit is reachable from any office
room, as well as those that instantiate our waypointing and
blocking requirement patterns; see Section IV-B for examples.
These requirements, which can be expressed in our framework,
are central to physical access control. Existing network policy
synthesis algorithms, therefore, are not sufficiently expressive
for handling access-control requirements for physical spaces.
Policy verification has also been studied in the context
of computer networks; see e.g. [28]. However, this line of
research is not concerned with synthesis, which is our work’s
main focus. We remark though that our synthesis algorithm can
be readily used for verifying the conformance of a set of local
policies to global access-control requirements; see Section VI.
Program Synthesis. Program synthesis techniques, such as
template-based synthesis [29]–[32], reactive program synthesis
from temporal specifications [33]–[35], and program repair
techniques [36], [37], are related to policy synthesis for
physical spaces. Similarly to our SMT-based algorithm, most
of these synthesis frameworks also supplement the logical
specification with a template, and exploit SMT solvers to
efficiently explore the search space defined by the template.
They cannot however express the relevant access-control re-
quirements we have considered, such as those pertaining to
branching properties. Our synthesis framework builds upon
these techniques, and extends them with support for specifi-
cations that are needed for physical spaces.
Methods for synthesizing models of logical formulas, such
as those in linear-temporal logic or CTL, have been extensively
studied in the literature [13], [33], [38]–[41]. In Section V, we
have described a policy synthesis algorithm based on CTL con-
troller synthesis. This algorithm however comes at the expense
of an exponential blow-up. Therefore, existing CTL synthesis
tools and algorithms cannot be readily applied to synthesize
attribute-based local policies in practice. Our efficient SMT-
based algorithm addresses this practical challenge.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have presented a framework for synthesizing locally
enforceable policies from global, system-wide access-control
requirements for physical spaces. Its key components are
(1) a declarative language along with patterns for writing
global requirements, (2) a model of the physical space de-
scribing how subjects access resources, and (3) an efficient
policy synthesis algorithm for generating policies compliant
with the requirements and the spatial constraints. Using real-
world case studies, we have demonstrated that our synthesis
framework is practical and scales to systems with complex
requirements and numerous policy enforcement points.
As future work, we plan to extend our policy synthesis
framework with architectural constraints. Examples include
optimality constraints, which can be used to synthesize lo-
cal policies that avoid re-checking attributes that have been
checked by other enforcement points. Handling such con-
straints is important for large-scale access-control systems in
practice. We also plan to apply our framework to synthesize
locally enforceable policies in other access-control domains,
such as access control in networks, which may require tailored
synthesis heuristics.
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APPENDIX
A. Correctness and Complexity of the Algorithm Scs
Correctness. We now prove the correctness of Scs.
Theorem 4. Let S be a resource structure and R a set of
requirements. If Scs(S,R) = c then S, c  R. If Scs(S,R) =
unsat then there is no configuration c such that S, c  R.
Proof. We prove the two implications by contradiction.
Assume that Scs(S,R) returns a configuration c. Suppose
for the sake of contradiction that S, c 6 R. Then, by definition
of , there is an access request q and a requirement T ⇒ ϕ
such that q ` T and Sc,q 6|= ϕ. Given a subset R′ ⊆ R
of the requirements, let TR′ = T1 ∧ ... ∧ Ti ∧ ¬Ti+1 ∧
· · · ∧ ¬Tn, where {T1 ⇒ ϕ1, . . . , Ti ⇒ ϕi} = R′ and
{Ti+1 ⇒ ϕi+1, . . . , Tn ⇒ ϕn} = R \ R′. The constraint TR′
corresponds to the target computed at line 7 of Algorithm 1.
Let Rq = {(T ⇒ ϕ) ∈ R | q ` T} be the set of all
requirements in R that are applicable to q. We have q ` TRq
(1). Furthermore, for any R′ ⊆ R where R′ 6= Rq , we have
q 6` TR′ (2). By definition of Sc,q , Sc,q contains an edge e
if e is an edge of S and q ` c(e). Algorithm 1 constructs
the configuration c by conjoining targets TR′ , where R′ ⊆ R,
to the local policies c(e); see line 14. From (1) and (2) we
conclude the following: First, adding ¬TRq to a local policy
c(e) removes the edge e in Sc,q because q 6` c(e) ∧ (¬TRq ).
Second, adding ¬TR′ to a local policy c(e), where R′ 6= Rq ,
does not remove the edge e in Sc,q because q ` c(e)∧ (¬TR′)
iff q ` c(e). It is immediate that Sc,q contains those edges
of S for which the target ¬TRq is not conjoined to the
local policy c(e). We conclude that Sc,q contains the edges
E′ = cs(S, ϕRq ) (see line 13 of Algorithm 1), where ϕRq
conjoins the access constraints of all requirements in Rq . By
definition of controller synthesis, we have (S,E′, r, L) |= ϕRq .
Since Sc,q = (R, E′, r, L), Sc,q |= ϕRq . We can now deduce
that Sc,q |= ϕ because (T ⇒ ϕ) ∈ Rq . But previously we
deduced that Sc,q 6|= ϕ. Thus we have a contradiction, and
there is no access request q and requirement T ⇒ ϕ such that
q ` T and Sc,q 6|= ϕ. Therefore, S, c  R.
Assume that Scs(S,R) = unsat. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that there is a configuration c such that S, c 
R. From Scs(S,R) = unsat, by definition of Algorithm 1,
it follows that there is a subset R′ = {T1 ⇒ ϕ1, . . . , Tk ⇒
ϕk} ⊆ R of the requirements and an access request q, such
that q ` T1∧· · ·∧Tk (1) and cs(S, ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕk) = unsat (2).
From (1), we know that all requirements in R′ are applicable
to q . Furthermore, since S, c  R, it must be that Sc,q |= ϕi,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We get Sc,q |= ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕk. From (2), by
definition of controller synthesis, there is no resource structure
S′ = (R, E′, r, L), with E′ ⊆ E, such that S′ |= ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕk.
Thus we have a contradiction, and we conclude that there is
no configuration c such that S, c  R.
This concludes our proof.
Complexity. The running time of algorithm Scs is determined
by the number of iterations of the loops, the complexity
of checking the satisfiability of the conjunction of targets
(line 8), and the complexity of solving each controller syn-
thesis instance (line 10). The first loop is executed |E| times,
where |E| is the number of edges, and the second loop is
executed 2|R| times. The second loop checks one satisfiability
id = out
sec zone = false
id = cor
sec zone = false
id = bur
sec zone = true
τU(E[(¬sec zone)U(id = bur)], out, ∅) ↪→
(Cout,cor ∧ Ccor,bur) ∨ Cout,bur
τU(A[(¬sec zone)U(id = bur)], out, ∅) ↪→
(Cout,cor ⇒ (¬Ccor,out))
Fig. 10: Encoding exists-until and always-until access con-
straints using SMT constraints.
instance and one controller synthesis instance. The complexity
of checking satisfiability is in O(2k·|A|) where k = |Dmax| for
the largest set Dmax of values that appears in the constraint
T , and |A| is the number of attributes. Solving a controller
synthesis instance requires checking (R, E′, re, L) |= ϕ at
most 2|E| times, where E′ ⊆ E and ϕ is a conjunction
of access constraints. The problem (R, E′, re, L) |= ϕ can
be decided using the model checking algorithm for CTL
based on labeling, which is in O(|ϕ| · (|R| + |E′|)), where
|ϕ| is the size of the access constraint ϕ [42]. The size
of the largest access constraint given as input to cs is in
O(|d|·|R|), where d is the largest access constraint that appears
in the requirements R. The running time of Scs is therefore
O(2|R| · (2k·|A| + 2|E| · |R| · d · (|R|+ |E|))).
B. SMT Encoding
Example. We illustrate the SMT encoding of an exists-until
and an always-until access constraint in Figure 10. The SMT
encoding of the access constraint E[(¬sec zone)U(id = bur)]
for the resource out formalizes that the two PEPs (out, cor)
and (cor, bur) grant access or the PEP (out, bur) grants access.
This guarantees the existence of a path that satisfies the access
constraint. The SMT encoding of A[(¬sec zone)U(id = bur)]
for the resource out formalizes that the always-until constraint
is satisfied along any path that starts from the resource out.
Since any path that start with (out, bur, . . .) satisfies the
access constraint, the SMT constraint imposes no constrains
on the PEP (out, bur). However, not all paths that start with
(out, cor, . . .) satisfy the access constraint. Concretely, the infi-
nite path (out, cor, out, cor, . . .) violates the access constraint.
The SMT constraint therefore formalizes that if there are
paths starting with (out, cor, . . .), i.e. the PEP (out, cor) grants
access, then the PEP (cor, out) denies access. This guarantees
that the path violating the access constraint is not present in
the resulting resource structure. Note that, since we consider
only deadlock-free resource structures, the absence of the
edge (cor, out) guarantees that the resulting resource structure
has the edge (cor, bur), and therefore all paths starting with
(out, cor, . . .) continue along resource bur.
Termination. We first prove that the rewrite rules given in
Figure 8 terminate.
Theorem 5. Let S = (R, E, r, L) be a resource structure.
For any resource r0 ∈ R and access constraint ϕ, the rewrite
function τ(ϕ, r0) terminates.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of the
access constrain ϕ. Formally, we define the length of an access
constraint ϕ, denoted by l(ϕ), as
l(true) = 1
l(a ∈ D) = 1
l(¬ϕ) = 1 + l(ϕ)
l(EXϕ) = 1 + l(ϕ)
l(AXϕ) = 1 + l(ϕ)
l(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = 1 + max(l(ϕ1), l(ϕ2))
l(E[ϕ1Uϕ2]) = 1 + max(l(ϕ1), l(ϕ2))
l(A[ϕ1Uϕ2]) = 1 + max(l(ϕ1), l(ϕ2))
where max(n1, n2) returns n1 if n1 ≥ n2, otherwise it
returns n2. Note that l(ϕ) ≥ 1 for any access constraint ϕ.
Base Case. For the base case, l(ϕ) = 1, the access constraint
is of the form true or a ∈ D. The rewrite function τ terminates
in one step.
Inductive Step. Assume that τ(ϕ, r0) terminates for any
access constraint ϕ of length l(ϕ) ≤ k (H1). We prove
that τ(ϕ, r0) terminates for any access constraint of length
l(ϕ) = k + 1.
• For the cases where the access constraint ϕ is of the form
¬ϕ1, EXϕ1, AXϕ1, the rewrite function τ(ϕ, r0) calls
τ(ϕ1, r0). By induction, τ(ϕ1, r0) terminates because
l(ϕ1) = k.
• The case where ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 also terminates because
l(ϕ1) ≤ k and l(ϕ2) ≤ k.
• For the cases where ϕ is of the form E[ϕ1Uϕ2] or
A[ϕ1Uϕ2], we need to show that τU(ϕ, r0, ∅) terminates.
We prove that τU(ϕ, r0, X) terminates for any set X ⊆ R
by descending induction on the size of the set X . For
the base case, we have |X| = |R|. Then, τU(ϕ, r0,R)
calls τ(ϕ1, r0) and τ(ϕ2, r0). By our inductive hypoth-
esis (H1), both τ(ϕ1, r0) and τ(ϕ2, r0) terminate since
l(ϕ1) ≤ k and l(ϕ2) ≤ k. For the inductive step, assume
that τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2]), r0, X) terminates for any X ⊆ R of
size k ≤ |X| ≤ |R| (H2). Consider a set X ′ ⊆ R of
size |X ′| = k − 1. Then, τU(ϕ, r0, X) calls the rewrite
functions τ(ϕ1, r0), τ(ϕ2, r0), and τU(ϕ, r1, X ′ ∪ {r0}),
for r1 ∈ E(r0) \ X . The rewrite function τ(ϕ1, r0),
τ(ϕ2, r0) terminate by the inductive hypothesis (H1).
By the inductive hypothesis (H2), the rewrite function
τU(ϕ, r1, X
′ ∪ {r0}) terminates because |X ∪ {r0}| = k.
This completes our proof.
Correctness. We now prove that the correctness of our
SMT-based policy synthesis algorithm. We start with several
definitions. Our definitions are similar to those used to describe
the decision procedure for CTL satisfiability given in [9]. Let
ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two access constraints and S = (R, E, r, L)
be a resource structure. We assume that S does not contain
deadlock resources, i.e. for any resource r0 ∈ R, the set
E(r0) = {r1 ∈ R | (r0, r1) ∈ E} is nonempty. We call access
constraints of the form A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and E[ϕ1Uϕ2] eventuality
constraints. We first define the derivation of a rooted directed
graph from S for a given access constraint ϕ2 and root
node r0 ∈ R. We call this graph an eventuality graph. We
then give two conditions over such eventuality graphs. The
first condition is satisfied iff S, r0 |= A[ϕ1Uϕ2], while the
second one is satisfied iff S, r0 |= E[ϕ1Uϕ2].
We define the eventuality graph G(S, r0, ϕ2) as the rooted
directed graph obtained by taking the node r0 and all nodes
and edges along all paths emanating from r0 up to and
including the first node r1 such that S, r1 |= ϕ2; if there
is no such node r1 along a path, then all nodes and edges
along the path are included in G(S, r0, ϕ2). We call a node of
G(S, r0, ϕ2) an interior node if it has successors; otherwise,
we call it a frontier node.
We now define the two conditions. We say that an eventu-
ality graph G(S, r0, ϕ2) fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] if
1) the graph is acyclic,
2) for any of its interior nodes r1 we have S, r1 |= ϕ1, and
3) for any of its frontier nodes r2 we have S, r2 |= ϕ2.
Note that for resource structures without deadlock resources,
(1) implies (3). We say that an eventuality graph G(S, r0, ϕ2)
fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2] if
1) the graph contains a frontier node r2 such that S, r2 |=
ϕ2, and
2) there is a path from r0 to this frontier node r2 such that
for any interior node r1 along the path we have S, r1 |=
ϕ1.
From the CTL satisfiability decision procedure of [9], it
follows that S, r0 |= A[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff G(S, r0, ϕ2) fulfills
A[ϕ1Uϕ2], and S, r0 |= E[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff G(S, r0, ϕ2) fulfills
E[ϕ1Uϕ2].
To prove the correctness of our SMT-based synthesis algo-
rithm, we first prove that τ correctly encodes access constraint
into SMT constraints. Towards this end, Theorem 6 establishes
that the SMT encoding is correct for any access constraint and
any singleton configuration template C = {c}, i.e. a template
consisting of one configuration. To prove this theorem, we
give two lemmas (Lemma 1 and Lemma 2), which show that
the rewrite function τU correctly encodes eventuality access
constraints. Afterwards, with Lemma 3 we lift the correctness
of the access constraints’ encoding to requirements. Finally,
we restate and prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 6. Let S = (R, E, r, S) be a resource structure. For
any configuration c for S, resource r0 ∈ R, access request
q ∈ Q, and access constraint ϕ, we have
Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ iff q ` τ(ϕ, r0).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the derivation of
τ(ϕ, r0).
• For the case ϕ = true, we have τ(ϕ, r0) = true. We get
Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ and q ` τ(ϕ, r0).
• For the case ϕ = (a ∈ D), we have τ(ϕ, r0) = true if
L(r0)(a) ∈ D, and τ(ϕ, r0) = false if L(r0)(a) 6∈ D.
Recall that Sc,q, r0 |= (a ∈ D) iff L(r0)(a) ∈ D. It is
immediate that Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ iff q ` τ(ϕ, r0).
• For the case ϕ = ¬ϕ′, we have τ(ϕ, r0) = ¬τ(ϕ′, r0).
⇒: Assume Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ. We get Sc,q, r0 6|= ϕ′. By
induction, q 6` τ(ϕ′, r0). Therefore q ` τ(ϕ, r0).
⇐: Assume q ` τ(ϕ, r0). We get q 6` τ(ϕ′, r0). By
induction, Sc,q 6|= ϕ′. Therefore Sc,q |= ϕ.
• For the case ϕ = ϕ1∧ϕ2, we have τ(ϕ, r0) = τ(ϕ1, r0)∧
τ(ϕ2, r0).
⇒: Assume Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ. Therefore Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ1 and
Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2. By induction, q ` τ(ϕ1, r0) and q `
τ(ϕ2, r0), and therefore q ` τ(ϕ, r0).
⇐: Assume q ` τ(ϕ, r0). Then q ` τ(ϕ1, r0) and q `
τ(ϕ2, r0). By induction, Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ1 and Sc,q, r0 |=
ϕ2, and therefore Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ.
• For the case ϕ = EXϕ′, we have τ(ϕ, r0) =
∃r1 ∈ E(r0). (Cr0,r1 ∧ τ(ϕ′, r1)).
⇒: Assume Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ. By definition of Sc,q , there is
an edge (r0, r1) in E such that q ` c((r0, r1)) (1) and
Sc,q, r1 |= ϕ′ (2). Since C = {c}, we have Cr0,r1 =
c((r0, r1)). From (1), we thus get q ` Cr0,r1 . From
(2), by induction, we get q ` τ(ϕ′, r1). It follows that
q ` τ(ϕ, r0).
⇐: Assume q ` τ(ϕ, r0). There is an edge r1 ∈ E(r0)
such that q ` Cr0,r1 (1) and q ` τ(ϕ′, r1) (2). From
(1), we get q ` c((r0, r1)), and thus there is an edge
(r0, r1) also in Sc,q . From (2), by induction, we get
S, r1 |= ϕ′. Therefore, Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ.
• For the case ϕ = AXϕ′, we have τ(ϕ, r0) =
∀r1 ∈ E(r0).
(
Cr0,r1 ⇒ τ(ϕ′, r1)
)
.
⇒: Assume Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ. Then, for any edge (r0, r1)
of Sc,q we have Sc,q, r1 |= ϕ′. Consider an edge
(r0, r1) ∈ E such that q ` Cr0,r1 . From q ` Cr0,r1 , we
know that (r0, r1) is also an edge in Sc,q . Therefore,
Sc,q, r1 |= ϕ′. By induction, q ` τ(ϕ′, r1). We get
q ` τ(ϕ, r0).
⇐: Assume q ` τ(ϕ, r0). Then for any edge (r0, r1) ∈
E, q ` Cr0,r1 implies q ` τ(ϕ′, r1). Consider an edge
(r0, r1) of Sc,q . We know that q ` Cr0,r1 , and thus
q ` τ(ϕ′, r1). By induction, Sc,q, r1 |= ϕ′. Therefore
Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ.
• For the case ϕ = E[ϕ1Uϕ2], we have τ(ϕ, r0) =
τU(ϕ, r0, ∅). By induction, for any resource r1 ∈ R and
any access request q ∈ Q we have∧
i∈{1,2}
Sc,q, r1 |= ϕi iff q ` τ(ϕi, r1).
By Lemma 2, we get Sc,q, r0 |= E[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff q `
τU(ϕ, r0, ∅).
• For case ϕ = A[ϕ1Uϕ2], have τ(ϕ, r0) = τU(ϕ, r0, ∅).
By induction, for any resource r1 ∈ R and any access
request q ∈ Q we have∧
i∈{1,2}
Sc,q, r1 |= ϕi iff q ` τ(ϕi, r1).
By Lemma 1, we get Sc,q, r0 |= A[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff q `
τU(ϕ, r0, ∅).
This concludes our proof.
Lemma 1. Let S = (R, E, r, S) be a resource structure,
ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two access constraints, and C = {c} be a
configuration template. If for any resource r1 ∈ R and any
access request q ∈ Q we have∧
i∈{1,2}
Sc,q, r1 |= ϕi iff q ` τ(ϕi, r1), (A1)
then for any resource r0 ∈ R we have
Sc,q, r0 |= A[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff q ` τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, ∅).
Proof. Assume (A1). Given a set X ⊆ R of resources, we say
that G(Sc,q, r0, ϕ2) is X-disjoint if no node of G(Sc,q, r0, ϕ2)
is contained in X . To avoid clutter, we will write G[r0] for
G(Sc,q, r0, ϕ2). We prove that for any set X ⊆ R \ {r0} of
resources,
G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff q ` τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X).
and G[r0] is X-disjoint
The proof proceeds by descending induction on the size
of the set X . Note that for the case X = ∅ we have
G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff q ` τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, ∅). This
case proves the lemma because G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff
Sc,q, r0 |= A[ϕ1Uϕ2].
Before we start, we expand τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X) to
τ(ϕ2, r0)∨ (1)(
τ(ϕ1, r0) (2)
∧ (∀r1 ∈ E(r0) ∩X. ¬Cr0,r1) (3)
∧ (∀r1 ∈ E(r0) \X.(Cr0,r1 ⇒
τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1, X ∪ {r0}))
))
, (4)
as defined in Figure 8. To avoid clutter, we write, e.g., (3) is
true for q ` ∀r1 ∈ E(r0) ∩X. ¬Cr0,r1 .
Base Case. For the base case we have X = R \ {r0}.
⇒: Assume G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and G[r0] is R \ {r0}-
disjoint. From R\ {r0}, G[r0] consists of a single node,
r0. Furthermore, r0 is a frontier node, and since G[r0]
fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2], we have Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2. From (A1),
we get q ` τ(ϕ2, r0). Since (1) is true, we get q `
τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R \ {r0}).
⇐: Assume q ` τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R \ {r0}). Since the re-
source structure Sc,q is deadlock-free, there is a resource
r1 in E(r0)∩ (R\ {r0}) such that q ` Cr0,r1 . It follows
that (3) is false. Therefore, it must be that q ` τ(ϕ2, r0).
By (A1), Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2. By definition of the eventuality
graph G[r0], we conclude that it consists of a single node,
r0. It is immediate that G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and that
it is R \ {r0}-disjoint.
Inductive Step. Assume that for any set X ⊆ R\{r0} of size
k ≤ |X| < |R|, G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and it is X-disjoint
iff τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X). We show that this holds for any set
X ⊂ R \ {r0} with |X| = k − 1.
⇒: Assume G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and it is X-disjoint.
Case 1: If Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2, then from (A1) we get q `
τ(ϕ2, r0). Since (1) is true, it is immediate that q `
τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X).
Case 2: If S, r0 6|= ϕ2, then by (A1) we have q 6`
τ(ϕ2, r0). Therefore, (1) is false, so we need to show
that (2), (3), and (4) are all true:
∗ Since G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2], we have S, r0 |= ϕ1
because r0 is an interior node. By (A1), we get
q ` τ(ϕ1, r0), and thus (2) is true.
∗ If G[r0] has an edge (r0, r1), then it must be that
the resource structure S has an edge (r0, r1) and
q ` c((r0, r1)); otherwise, the edge (r0, r1) is
removed from Sc,q . Furthermore, since C = {c},
C does not contain any control variables, and so
Cr0,r1 = c((r0, r1)). Now, since G[r0] is X-
disjoint, we know that r0 does not have any succes-
sors contained in X . Therefore, for any successor
r1 of r0, we have q 6` Cr0,r1 . We conclude that (3)
is true.
∗ Finally, consider an edge r1 ∈ E(r0)\X such that
q ` Cr0,r1 . Since G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and r1 is
a successor of r0, it follows that G(Sc,q, r1, ϕ2)
also fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2]. Furthermore, since G[r0]
is X-disjoint, G(Sc,q, r1, ϕ2) must be also X-
disjoint. Furthermore, G(Sc,q, r1, ϕ2) does not con-
tain the node r0 because G[r0] is acyclic. We
conclude that G(Sc,q, r1, ϕ2) is X ∪ {r0}-disjoint
and it fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2]. By induction, we get
q ` τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1, X ∪ {r0}). Therefore, (4) is
true.
⇐: Assume q ` τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X).
Case 1: If q ` τ(ϕ2, r0), then (1) is true. By (A1),
Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2. It is immediate that G[r0] consists
of a single node, namely r0. Therefore, G[r0] fulfills
A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and it is X-disjoint because X ⊂ R\{r0}.
Case 2: If q 6` τ(ϕ2, r0), then (1) is false. Therefore,
(2), (3), and (4) must be true. From (2) and (A1),
we have Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ1. Consider any node r1 ∈
E(r0) \ X such that q ` Cr0,r1 . Then, r1 is a
successor of r0 in the graph G[r0]. From (4), we
get q ` τU(A[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1, X ∪ {r0}). By induction,
G(Sc,q, r1, ϕ2) fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2] and it is X ∪ {r0}-
disjoint. Since r0 is an internal node, S, r0 |= ϕ1,
and all subgraphs rooted at r0’s successors fulfill
A[ϕ1Uϕ2], it follows that G[r0] fulfills A[ϕ1Uϕ2]. Fur-
thermore, from (3) we know that r0 has no successors
in X . Since all subgraphs rooted at r0’s successors are
X ∪ {r0}-disjoint, it follows that G[r0] is X-disjoint.
This concludes our proof.
Lemma 2. Let S = (R, E, r, S) be a resource structure,
ϕ1 and ϕ2 be two access constraints, and C = {c} be a
configuration template. If for any resource r1 ∈ R and any
access request q ∈ Q we have∧
i∈{1,2}
Sc,q, r1 |= ϕi iff q ` τ(ϕi, r1), (A2)
then for any resource r0 ∈ R we have
Sc,q, r0 |= E[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff q ` τ(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, ∅).
Proof. Given a directed graph G = (R, E) and a subset X ⊂
R of resources, we define the projection of G on X as G|X =
(X, {(r0, r1) ∈ E | {r0, r1} ⊆ X}). We will write G[r0] for
G(Sc,q, r0, ϕ2). We prove by induction on the size of the set
X that for any {r0} ⊆ X ⊆ R, we have
G[r0]|X fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff q ` τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R \X).
Note that since G|R = G and τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R \ R) =
τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, ∅), the case for X = R proves the lemma.
We first expand τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R \X) to
τ(ϕ2, r0)∨ (5)(
τ(ϕ1, r0) (6)
∧ ∃r1 ∈ E(r0)\(R\X).
(
Cr0,r1
∧ τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1, (R \X) ∪ {r0})
))
(7)
Base Case. For the base case, we have X = {r0}.
⇒: Assume that G(Sc,q, r0, ϕ2)|{r0} fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2]. The
graph G[r0]|{r0} consists of the single node r0. The
node r0 is a frontier node, and therefore it must be that
Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2. By (A2), we have q ` τ(ϕ2, r0). Then (5)
is true and therefore q ` τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R \ {r0}).
⇐: Assume that q ` τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R \ {r0}). Since here
X = {r0} and S’s edge relation is irreflexive, we have
E(r0)\(R\{r0}) = ∅. Therefore, (7) is false and it must
be that q ` τ(ϕ2, r0). By (A2), we have Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2.
It is immediate that the graph G[r0]|{r0} consists of the
single node r0, and that it fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2].
Inductive Step. Assume that G[r0]|X fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2] iff
q ` τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R\X) holds for any set {r0} ⊆ X ⊂ R
of size 1 ≤ |X| ≤ k, for some k, 1 ≤ k < |R|. We show that
this also holds for any set {r0} ⊂ X ⊆ R of size |X| = k+1.
⇒: Assume G[r0]|X fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2].
Case 1: If Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2, then from (A2) we
get q ` τ(ϕ2, r0). It is immediate that q `
τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0,R \X).
Case 2: If Sc,q, r0 6|= ϕ2, then from (A2) we get
q 6` τ(ϕ2, r0). Since G[r0]|X fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0
is an internal node and Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ1. By (A2),
q ` τ(ϕ1, r0), and so (6) is true. Furthermore, r0
has a successor r1 with q ` Cr0,r1 such that r1 has
a path to a node rn with Sc,q, rn |= ϕ2. We con-
clude that G(Sc,q, r1, ϕ2)|(X\{r0}) fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2].
By induction, since |X \ {r0}| = k − 1, we have q `
τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1,R\ (X \{r0})). Since r0 ∈ X , from
R\(X\{r0}) = (R\X)∪{r0} we conclude that (7) is
also true. We conclude that q ` τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X).
⇐: Assume q ` τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r0, X).
Case 1: If q ` τ(ϕ2, r0), then from (A2) we get
Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2. Therefore the graph G[r0]|X consists of
the single node r0 with Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ2. It is immediate
that G[r0]|X fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2].
Case 2: If q 6` τ(ϕ2, r0), then it must be that (6) and
(7) are true. From (6) and (A2), we get Sc,q, r0 |= ϕ1.
From (7), it follows that r0 has a successor r1 with
q ` Cr0,r1 such that q ` τU(E[ϕ1Uϕ2], r1, (R \X) ∪
{r0}). Since r0 ∈ X , we have (R \ X) ∪ {r0} =
R \ (X \ {r0}). By induction, G(Sc,q, r1, ϕ2)|X\{r0}
fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2], so there is a path from r1, . . . , rn in
G(Sc,q, r1, ϕ2)|X∪{r0} along nodes in X \{r0} where
Sc,q, rn |= ϕ2 and Sc,q, ri |= ϕ1 for 1 ≤ i < n.
It is immediate that there is a path r0, r1, . . . , rn in
G[r0]|X such that Sc,q, rn |= ϕ2 and Sc,q, ri |= ϕ1 for
1 ≤ i < n. Therefore G[r0]|X fulfills E[ϕ1Uϕ2].
This concludes our proof.
Lemma 3. Given a resource structure S = (R, E, r, L), a
set R = {T1 ⇒ ϕ1, . . . , Tn ⇒ ϕn} of requirements, and a
configuration template C = {c}, let φ = ENCODE(S, T1 ⇒
ϕ1, C)∧· · ·∧ENCODE(S, Tn ⇒ ϕn, C). The constraint ∀a. φ
is satisfiable iff S, c  R.
Proof. Note that since C = {c}, the formula φ contains no
control variables, i.e. it contains only attribute variables. Since
there is a one-to-one mapping from a valuation of the attribute
variables ~a to an access request q, we have ∀~a. φ iff ∀q ∈
Q. q ` φ. We expand the constraint φ to (T1 ⇒ τ(ϕ1, r)) ∧
· · · ∧ (Tn ⇒ τ(ϕn, r)). We get that ∀~a. φ iff for any access
request q ∈ Q, and for any requirement T ⇒ ϕ, q ` T implies
q ` τ(ϕ, r). By Lemma 6, q ` τ(ϕ, r) iff Sc,q, r |= ϕ. We get
∀~a. φ iff for any access request q ∈ Q, and for any requirement
T ⇒ ϕ, q ` T implies Sc,q, r |= ϕ. By definition of , we
get ∀~a. φ iff S, c  R.
We now restate and prove Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let S be resource structure, R a set of require-
ments, and C a configuration template. If Ssmt(S,R,C) = c
then S, c  R. If Ssmt(S,R,C) = unsat, then there is no
configuration c in C such that S, c  R.
Proof. Let C = {c1, . . . , cn}. The formula ∃~z.∀~a. φ generated
by Algorithm 2 is equivalent to the formula (∀~a. φc1)∨ · · · ∨
(∀~a. φcn) where φci is the formula obtained by grounding
the control variables ~z in φ with those values that encode the
configuration ci. Note that each formula φci is equivalent to the
one obtained when using a configuration template Ci = {ci}.
Assume that ∃c ∈ C. S, c  R. By Lemma 3, ∀~a. φci is
satisfiable for some ci in C. Therefore Ssmt(S,R,C) returns
some configuration ci. Assuming the DERIVE procedure cor-
rectly derives a configuration ci from a model of ∃~z∀~a. φ,
then Ssmt(S,R,C) = ci for some ci such that ∀~a. φci . By
Lemma 3, S, ci  R.
Assume that ¬∃c ∈ C. S, c  R. By Lemma 3, ∀~a. φci is
not satisfiable for any ci in C. Therefore Ssmt(S,R,C) returns
unsat.
